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VIRTUAL WORLDS, REAL RULES
CAROLINE BRADLEY* & A. MICHAEL FROOMKIN†
In virtual worlds such as Ultima Online and Everquest, the In-
ternet may accidentally provide an environment that lends itself
well to the testing of legal rules.
A growing literature suggests that there is a relationship be-
tween certain legal rules and economic well-being.1  Indeed, data
about the economic consequences of such rules would enormously
enrich debates over economic regulation.  Unfortunately, in the
real world, experimenting with legal rules can be costly and risky.
Some scholars of comparative law attempt to draw lessons by com-
paring the diverse experiences of different countries,2 but these ef-
forts too often fall prey to errors of cultural, not to mention legal,
translation.3
Virtual worlds could permit experiments without the real
world costs of bad rules or regulatory competition.  Existing role-
playing games tend to include internal market regulations that re-
semble those seen in Western capitalist economies.  Such regula-
tions could be changed, or different versions of the game might use
different variants of particular rules.  Online role playing games
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.  LL.M., Jesus College,
Cambridge, 1984.  We would both like to acknowledge the University of Miami School
of Law’s support for the writing of this article.  Comments welcome to
cbradley@law.miami.edu and froomkin@law.miami.edu.
† Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.  J.D., Yale Law School,
1987; M.Phil., Cambridge University, 1984.
1. On the relationship between finance and growth, see, for example, ROSS LE-
VINE, FINANCE AND GROWTH: THEORY AND EVIDENCE (National Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 10766, Sept. 2004), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/
w10766.pdf.  For a discussion of the importance of law to finance see, for example,
Stephen J. Choi, Law, Finance, and Path Dependence: Developing Strong Securities Markets, 80
TEX. L. REV 1657 (2002).
2. See, e.g., HIDEKI KANDA & CURTIS J. MILHAUPT, RE-EXAMINING LEGAL TRANS-
PLANTS: THE DIRECTOR’S FIDUCIARY DUTY IN JAPANESE CORPORATE LAW (Columbia Law
School Center for Law and Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 219, Mar. 2003),
available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/law-economicstudies/papers/WP219.pdf.
3. See Caroline Bradley, Transatlantic Misunderstandings: Corporate Law and Socie-
ties, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 269 (1999).
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would provide better data than economic models because games
can be designed to reduce the number of assumptions involved.
Moreover, game participants are likely to care more about out-
comes than participants in laboratory based experiments, if only be-
cause resource constraints force laboratory testing to be conducted
for low stakes.
This article considers the extent to which massively multi-
player online role playing games (hereinafter, “MMORPGs” or “vir-
tual worlds”) might be designed to allow the testing of legal rules.
The increasing popularity of online role playing games such as Ul-
tima Online and other virtual worlds has prompted a wave of arti-
cles discussing the legal relationships among players and player-
characters within the games and between gamers and game owners.
Several commentators also address the extent to which relation-
ships within games might interact in legally significant ways with
relationships in “meat space.”4  This article takes a different tack
from that burgeoning literature.  Rather than examine legal rela-
tionships within or arising from existing games, we discuss whether
this dynamic new ludic phenomenon might be harnessed to solve a
long-running, and (we argue) worsening problem in the design of
legal rules — the barriers to experimentation.
Legal rules are extraordinarily difficult and expensive to test in
the field.5  There are no such things as controlled conditions.  De-
spite the saying that states are little laboratories of democracy,6 the
reality is that any real life experimentation happens slowly, in real
time, and runs the risk that real costs may fall entirely on the inno-
cent if something goes wrong.  Despite these risks, countries fre-
quently experiment with new rules, and the development of legal
institutions over time involves significant expenditures.  Accord-
ingly, legislatures, law reform commissions, agencies, committees,
and consultants must be provided with the resources to carry out
4. “Meat space” is what is commonly regarded as the “real world.”
5. See generally, Symposium, Empirical and Experimental Methods in Law, 2002 U.
ILL. L. REV. 791.
6. Justice Brandeis actually said, “It is one of the happy incidents of the federal
system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  As
Justice Brandeis well understood, even if the rest of the nation was insulated from risk,
the experimenters were not.
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their functions.  Bad choices, however, involve further expense if a
new rule fails to achieve its objectives or imposes excessive costs on
the regulated economies or on bystanders.  Therefore, better infor-
mation about the economic consequences of rules would enor-
mously enrich debates over economic regulation.
In this very preliminary effort we do not seek to define the pre-
cise conditions for a suitably controlled online experiment, nor is it
our goal to identify specific legal rules that are ideally suited for
testing.  Rather, we have three modest objectives.  First, to make the
case that a test bed for legal rules would be useful at any time, and
is increasingly necessary as legal harmonization marches on.  Sec-
ondly, to suggest that online games might serve as a superior plat-
form on which to test legal rules.  We conclude with some
schematic thoughts as to what types of rules might lend themselves
to this sort of testing and which do not.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE SEARCH FOR BETTER RULES
There is little debate that legal rules affect the quality of life,
and that many rules affect economic success.7  Bad rules can con-
tribute to inefficiency; very bad rules enable or enforce waste or
even tyranny.  Good rules promote economic and social well-being,
although too much of a good thing may have its own costs.  The
creation of good rules, and the improvement of existing ones, are
agreed to be important objectives for policymakers, academics, and
indeed, for everyone.  Of course, when people disagree about fun-
damentals of social policy, the debate as to what is a good rule is
primarily a debate between competing objectives.  But even when
people agree as to the basic objective that a particular law should
serve, there can be great uncertainty and fierce debate as to what
type of rule works best to achieve that goal.
For example, a growing literature suggests that, for any particu-
lar country, economic growth depends on the availability of capi-
tal.8  Sophisticated financial systems underpinned by particular
7. See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000); Richard A. Pos-
ner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 WORLD BANK RESEARCH OB-
SERVER 1 (1998), available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/journals/wbro/obs
feb98/pdf/article1.pdf.
8. See, e.g., DE SOTO, supra note 7, at 5 (“[T]he major stumbling block that keeps
the rest of the world from benefitting from capitalism is its inability to produce capital.
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legal rules generate capital by attracting investment.9  Financial sys-
tems are constituted by a range of different types of rules from
property10 and contract law, through corporate law and financial
regulation.  These foundational rules that facilitate transactions
and promote investor confidence have evolved differently in differ-
ent countries over centuries.11  Some economies are more success-
ful than others, however, raising the possibility that some rules work
better than others, and further, that transplanting those rules to
less successful economies might promote economic success.
In the absence of reliable information as to what works best,
national regulators face a bewildering set of conflicting pressures
when designing legal rules.  For example, globalization and techno-
logical development encourage transnational transactions.12  Con-
versely, foreign (and even domestic) national regulatory schemes
Capital is . . . the lifeblood of the capitalist system, the foundation of progress, and the
one thing that the poor countries of the world cannot seem to produce for
themselves.”).
9. See, e.g., RUSSIAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ROUNDTABLE, WHITE PAPER ON COR-
PORATE GOVERNANCE IN RUSSIA 6 (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
10/3/2789982.pdf (“During the last decade, policy makers, regulators and market par-
ticipants around the world have increasingly come to emphasise [sic] the need to de-
velop good corporate governance practices. The reason for this is an increasing amount
of empirical evidence showing that good corporate governance facilitates corporate ac-
cess to capital markets, improves investor’s confidence and contributes to corporate
competitiveness. From this perspective, considerable effort at the national and interna-
tional level has been invested to promote and assist efforts to improve corporate
governance.”).
10. De Soto argues that Western capitalism depends on the “representational pro-
cess” which allows assets to “lead an invisible, parallel life alongside their material exis-
tence.” DE SOTO, supra note 7, at 6. See also, e.g., Gerald P. O’Driscoll Jr. & Lee
Hoskins, Property Rights: The Key to Economic Development, POLICY ANALYSIS No. 482, Aug.
7, 2003, available at  http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa482.pdf.
11. See, e.g., ANTHONY OGUS, COMPARING REGULATORY SYSTEMS: INSTITUTIONS,
PROCESSES AND LEGAL FORMS IN INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES (Centre on Regulation and
Competition Working Paper Series, Paper No. 35, Dec. 2002), available at  http://
idpm.man.ac.uk/crc/wpdl149/wp35.pdf.  De Soto suggests that one difficulty in achiev-
ing the transition to capitalism is that Western capitalist nations which have achieved
this transition do not have a clear recipe for transition. DE SOTO, supra note 7, at 164
(“As successful as those nations have been, they were not always conscious of what they
were doing and left behind no clear blueprint.”).
12. See, e.g., Bernhard Grossfeld, Global Accounting: Where Internet Meets Geography,
48 AM. J. COMP. L. 261, 263-64 (2000) (“The globalization of communication networks
creates a kind of instant knowledge of everything, opens new means of implicit coopera-
tion through markets, and is crucial for the globalization of economic flows. Globalized
financial information makes it inexpensive and easy to effect share transactions abroad.
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may impede them.13  Meanwhile, global or regional agreements to
promote free trade in goods and services undermine the ability of
nations to impose their own rules.14  International institutions ar-
gue that harmonization of standards protects economic stability.15
Academics offer policymakers equally conflicting advice.16  Some
advocates of free trade in goods and services argue for harmoniza-
tion of legal rules in order to facilitate free trade and reduce regula-
tory arbitrage.17  Others argue that markets, rather than bureau-
crats, can produce the most efficient legal rules.18  Unfortunately,
in the real world, experimenting with legal rules can be costly and
risky.
Therefore, financial transactions take on an increasingly global character.” (footnotes
omitted)).
13. See, e.g., Stephen Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The Prospects
and Limits of New Approaches to Transatlantic Governance Through Mutual Recognition and
Safe Harbor Agreements, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 29, 31 (2002) (“[T]he challenge confronting
political leaders is to reduce redundant regulatory barriers to trade, where possible,
without sacrificing democratic choice regarding the appropriate allocation of risks and
the appropriate strategies for addressing them.”).
14. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory
Competition, 52 EMORY L.J. 1353, 1362 (2003) (arguing that financial regulators have
been “forced to engage in the power sharing (and concomitant power reduction) that
occurs during the process of regulatory globalization”).
15. See, e.g., BASLE COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVER-
GENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS, A REVISED FRAMEWORK 2
(Bank for Int’l Settlements, 2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107a.pdf
(“The fundamental objective of the Committee’s work to revise the 1988 Accord has
been to develop a framework that would further strengthen the soundness and stability
of the international banking system while maintaining sufficient consistency that capital
adequacy regulation will not be a significant source of competitive inequality among
internationally active banks. The Committee believes that the revised Framework will
promote the adoption of stronger risk management practices by the banking industry,
and views this as one of its major benefits.”).
16. Contrast, for example, John C. Coates IV, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities
Regulation: A Political Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531, 582 (2001) (arguing
that financial industry interests may benefit from regulatory harmonization), with Ste-
phen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach
of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998) (suggesting that issuers of securities
should be allowed to choose what legal rules apply to them as a means of encouraging
regulatory competition).
17. See, e.g., Grossfeld, supra note 12, at 273 (“The diversity of accounting stan-
dards does not fit into the concept of global corporate players on global corporate
markets.”).
18. See, e.g., Stephen Choi, Promoting Issuer Choice in Securities Regulation, 41 VA. J.
INT’L L. 815 (2001).
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Similar conflicts occur on a smaller scale for many purely, or
primarily, domestic rules.  Traditional approaches to the design of
legal rules include what one might call the experimental method,
the social-scientific method, and the comparativist method.  In the-
ory at least, these approaches are broadly complementary rather
than exclusive.  Consider, for example, how each approach might
deal with the design of a rule intended to prevent littering.  The
experimental method consists of writing a rule, perhaps one based
on existing formal or informal rules for similar problems,19 trying it
for some time, and then altering it in light of experience.  Thus, a
rule to control littering might draw from the law of nuisances and
impose fines for improper trash disposal.  The social-scientific
method begins by designing a rule thought to conform with one or
more theories of human behavior.  An antipollution statute in-
formed by economic thinking might seek to internalize externali-
ties by creating a market for trash or for the cleanup of trash.  A
similar statute informed primarily by psychological theories might
regulate the design of public wastebaskets to make them pleasing to
use, or would create a public anti-littering campaign to shame litter-
ers into compliance with a social norm.  A comparativist approach
would seek to learn how other jurisdictions address the littering
problem, with an eye to adapting — or adopting — a rule that has
worked elsewhere.20
While each of these approaches has virtues, all have vices.  The
experimental method takes time, and for serious problems, a
flawed rule is potentially costly in both lives and treasure.  In addi-
tion, there is the danger of path-dependence and entrenchment.
In a democratic system, the implementation of a flawed rule (“Ver-
sion 1.0”) may create winners as well as losers, and those winners
may be loath to give up their personal advantage for the sake of the
19. For example, the UCC was based in part on existing customs of merchants.
See, e.g., Posner, supra note 7, at 6.
20. Cf. FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE POLITICS AND INCENTIVES OF LEGAL TRANSPLANTA-
TION 3 (CID Working Paper No. 44, Ctr. For Int’l Dev. at Harvard Univ., Apr. 2000),
available at http://www2.cid.harvard.edu/cidwp/044.pdf (“[N]ations, especially new
and transforming nations, may believe that indigenous law-making is an important
marker of a successful transformation, and as a consequence may choose to reject extra-
national influence, even under circumstances in which the extra-national influence is
perceived to be valuable and well-meaning, in favour of ‘doing it themselves,’ even if
that means doing it less well.”).
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commonweal.  If the benefit of an improved rule — Version 2.0 —
is widely dispersed, but the advantages of Version 1.0 are more
closely held, the initial beneficiaries may have both the incentives
and the means to lobby against what might be a Kaldor-Hicks im-
provement21 but not Pareto-superior22 move, even if Version 2.0
would have been Pareto-superior to the status quo ante.
The social-scientific method suffers from the clashes between
disciplines (is littering an economic, a psychological, a health, or a
moral problem?) and within them — for example, economists disa-
gree about how one should value the freedom to litter and the aes-
thetic value of litter-free streets, parks, and vistas.
It would seem that the comparative method has much to rec-
ommend it, at least as a complement to other approaches.  Why not
free ride on the experience of others?23  Ideally, one might learn
what works or, at least, learn what to avoid.24
One of the apparent advantages of borrowing a foreign legal
rule is that there are data about the effects of the rules in the coun-
try of origin.  Unfortunately, there may be many difficulties in find-
ing and interpreting relevant data.  In particular, those seeking to
transplant a foreign rule may lack information about crucial charac-
teristics of the rule’s context — information which would affect
how the rule would function when transplanted.  For example, le-
gal rules that require people to comply with standards of good faith
and fair dealing or due care assume it is possible to identify relevant
community standards, but even if there are relevant community
standards, they may vary from place to place.  For this reason, some
commentators suggest that definite rules may be easier to trans-
plant than vague standards because bright line rules are easier to
21. Named for Nicolas Kaldor and John Hicks, the Kaldor-Hicks improvement is
“any alternative that increases the economic value of social resources.” Kaldor-Hicks ef-
ficency, WIKIPEDIA at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kaldor-Hicks_efficency.
22. A Pareto-superior move is one that makes at least one individual better off
without making any other individual worse off. Pareto efficency, WIKIPEDIA at http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_efficency.
23. See, e.g., ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 7 (1974) (“[I]n the Western world
borrowing (with adaptation) has been the usual way of legal development.”).
24. Although WATSON, supra note 23, at 17, suggests that a rule which works badly
in its original home may work well elsewhere.
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administer, and will work whether or not appropriate community
standards exist.25
Institutions matter,26 and the institutional context for rules af-
fects how they operate in the world.27  Rules evolved in developed
economies with highly developed institutions may not transplant
well to developing economies with a substantial informal public sec-
tor.28  Many comparative lawyers argue that these variations in legal
culture make the transplantation of legal rules problematic.29  A
strong statement of this view would be that legal transplants are
impossible.30
Moreover, the effects of a rule requiring people to comply with
standards of good faith and fair dealing will differ depending on
variables such as the extent to which informal social mechanisms31
or the discipline of the market32 constrain behavior.  In some cir-
cumstances social networks or markets may enforce higher stan-
dards of behavior than legal rules.33  Accordingly, focusing on a
25. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 7, at 4-5.
26. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECO-
NOMIC PERFORMANCE 10 (1990).
27. See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems are Not Converging, 45 INT’L &
COMP. L. Q. 52, 56 (1996) “[R]ules are pernicious to the extent that they present but a
surface image of a legal system.”).
28. See, e.g., Allen Schick, Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand
Reforms, 13 WORLD BANK RESEARCH OBSERVER 123 (1998), available at  http://www.world
bank.org/research/journals/wbro/obsfeb98/pdf/article7.pdf.
29. See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz, et al., The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 163,
171 (2003) (“[T]he social, economic and institutional context often differs remarkably
between origin and transplant country, creating fundamentally different conditions for
effectuating the imported legal order in the latter. Transplant countries therefore are
likely to suffer from the transplant effect, i.e. the mismatch between preexisting condi-
tions and institutions and transplanted law, which weakens the effectiveness of the im-
ported legal order.”).
30. See, e.g., Legrand, supra note 27; Pierre Legrand, What “Legal Transplants?”, in
ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 55  (David Nelken & Johannes Feest, eds., 2001).
31. See, e.g., BARAK D. RICHMAN, COMMUNITY ENFORCEMENT OF INFORMAL CON-
TRACTS: JEWISH DIAMOND MERCHANTS IN NEW YORK (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr. for Law,
Econ., & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 384, 2002), available at  http://www.law.harvard.
edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/384.pdf.
32. See, e.g., Douglas W. Diamond, Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets, 97 J. POL.
ECON. 828 (1989).
33. This is a common justification for self-regulation. See, e.g., SRO CONSULTATIVE
COMM., INT’L ORG. OF SECS. COMM’NS, MODEL FOR EFFECTIVE REGULATION 5 (2000),
available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/ioscopd110.pdf (“Incorporat-
ing self-regulation into the regulatory framework will result in better regulation because
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single legal rule, isolated from a broader context which includes
social and market constraints on behavior, risks simplistic
conclusions.
Nevertheless, sometimes it is necessary to simplify to make a
problem manageable.  Even if one were to focus on legal rules with-
out trying to model the greater social and economic context in
which they operate, the means by which a law is enforced will affect
its actual operation.  Returning to our example, the effect of requir-
ing compliance with standards of good faith and fair dealing will
differ depending on the legal mechanisms for enforcing compli-
ance with those standards.  The risk of litigation will only act as a
deterrent if people who are harmed by bad faith and unfair dealing
have effective access to the courts to obtain a remedy.  Effective ac-
cess to the courts depends on factors such as the jurisdictional rules
controlling acceptance of cases, arrangements for funding litiga-
tion, judicial attitudes about the desirability of hearing particular
types of cases (e.g., are the judges concerned about opening flood-
gates), the ways in which judges are appointed,34 the extent of judi-
cial corruption, and the training of lawyers.  As an example, there is
a substantial degree of similarity between the substantive rules of
corporate law in Britain and many states in the United States, yet
there is much less litigation about corporate law in Britain than in
the United States.35  Specifically, standards of behavior for corpo-
rate directors are less likely to be enforced through private litiga-
tion in Britain than in the United States.  On the other hand,
governmental authorities play an important role in disciplining cor-
the statutory regulator’s statute and rules are supplemented and enforced by those enti-
ties directly involved in the regulated activity, which will have more detailed knowledge
of the operational or technical aspects of the activity. Additionally, self-regulation may
result in better compliance with rules because it may be more easily accepted by the
regulated parties.”).
34. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM:
A NEW WAY OF APPOINTING JUDGES (2003), available at  http://www.lcd.gov.uk/consult/
jacommission/index.htm.
35. See, e.g., Geoffrey Miller, Political Structure and Corporate Governance: Some Points
of Contrast Between the United States and England, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 51.  On com-
parisons between corporate law in the United States and Britain, see, for example,
Bradley, supra note 3.
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porate directors in Britain.36  Different systems may allocate en-
forcement functions to private or to public entities.
Identifying optimal rules for economic success remains prob-
lematic.  Individual rules exist in particular institutional and cul-
tural contexts that are bound to affect how they operate.37  Rules of
contract law may work differently in different social contexts with
different enforcement mechanisms.38  There may not be a globally
optimal rule for some issues as certain rules might work better in
different contexts.39  The idea that the context of rules matters has
two sets of implications.  First, scholars may attribute the success of
a particular rule to the rule itself when in fact it is something
outside the rule that has beneficial effects.  Second, even if a rule is
successful in one context, it might have different effects if trans-
planted to a new one.40
36. See, e.g., Caroline Bradley, Enterprise and Entrepreneurship: The Impact of Director
Disqualification, 1 J. OF CORP. L. STUD. 53 (2001) (suggesting that the United States
relies on private monitoring of corporate directors whereas public authorities in the
United Kingdom are more actively involved in disciplining directors through the direc-
tor disqualification statute).  Since the Enron scandal, the SEC has discovered a new
interest in barring people from acting as directors of public corporations.
37. Cf. W.S. Holdsworth, Case Law, 50 L. Q. REV. 180, 195 (1934) (“The imitation
of foreign examples . . . may result in changing the inconveniences which they know of
for the greater inconveniences from which the virtues of our own laws and institutions
have saved us.”); Percy H. Winfield, Law Reform, 44 L. Q. REV. 289, 303 (1928) (“[I]t
does not follow that, because the law about cheques works well in England, Germany
should instantly adopt the same rules. Each legal rule must be considered in relation to
its national surroundings.”).
38. See, e.g., Paul Collier & Jan Willem Gunning, Why has Africa Grown Slowly?, 13 J.
ECON. PERSP. 3, 11 (1999) (“The problem of contract enforcement thus makes markets
less competitive and reduces the potential gains from trade, while tending to perpetu-
ate the dominant position of minorities in business.”).
39. See, e.g., Ugo Mattei & Alberto Monti, Comparative Law and Economics: Borrowing
and Resistance, 1 GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS 5 (2001) (“Different legal traditions may de-
velop alternative solutions for the same legal problem that are neutral from the stand-
point of efficiency. In other words, the same legal rule may be efficient or inefficient
depending on the institutional background it refers to and different legal rules may all
turn out to be efficient when located in different institutional frameworks.”).
40. Watson recognizes that transplanted rules may work differently in different
places.  Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and European Private Law, 4.4 ELECTRONIC J.
COMP. L. (Dec. 2000), at http://www.ejcl.org/44/art44-2.html (“[F]rom early days I
have argued that a rule once transplanted is different in its new home.”); WATSON,
supra note 23, at 5 (“[E]xcept where the systems are closely related the differences in
legal values may be so extreme as to render virtually meaningless the discovery that
systems have the same or a different rule.”).
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Therefore, if policymakers are going to change rules based on
some idea that new rules will promote economic success it would be
useful to be able to identify how and why rules work, and to explore
how to carry out successful transplantations.41
Governments and international organizations now42 accept
that good governance is essential for economic success43  and stabil-
ity.44  Good governance includes a range of different legal rules.45
41. See KANDA & MILHAUPT, supra note 2, at 5 (“[T]here is little agreement among
scholars on transplant feasibility and the conditions for successful transplants, or even
how to define ‘success.’ Moreover, there is little analysis of how the success or failure of
legal transplants relates to the achievement of larger goals, such as economic
development.”).
42. See, e.g., Daniel Kaufmann, Rethinking Governance, Empirical Lessons Challenge
Orthodoxy, (2003) (discussion draft) available at  http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/gov
ernance/pdf/rethink_gov_stanford.pdf (“Less than a decade ago, governance issues
did not figure prominently in the agenda of international financial and development
institutions.”).
43. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT RE-
PORT 16 (2003), available at  http://www.undp.org/hdr2003/pdf/hdr03_complete.pdf
(“There are many reasons economic development continues to bypass many of the
world’s poorest people and places.  One common reason is poor governance.  When
governments are corrupt, incompetent or unaccountable to their citizens, national
economies falter.  When income inequality is very high, rich people often control the
political system and simply neglect poor people, forestalling broadly based develop-
ment.  Similarly, if governments fail to invest adequately in the health and education of
their people, economic growth will eventually peter out because of an insufficient num-
ber of healthy, skilled workers.  Without sound governance — in terms of economic
policies, human rights, well-functioning institutions and democratic political participa-
tion — no country with low human development can expect long-term success in its
development efforts or expanded support from donor countries.”); The Hon. Alexan-
der Downer, MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Australia, Speech at the launch of the
Economic Analytical Unit report Changing Corporate Asia: What Business Needs to
Know, Sydney (Mar. 7, 2002), at  http://www.foreignminister.gov.au/speeches/2002/
020307_fa_chnge_corp_asia.html (“A rules-based business environment is essential for
market economies to develop and grow. Shareholders, creditors, investors, input suppli-
ers and consumers need to feel safe doing business with people they don’t know. The
markets they create will ensure savings go to the best investments, maximising growth
and living standards.”).
44. See, e.g., Kaufmann, supra note 42, at 4  (“The concern has ceased to be merely
one of an economic nature, or one of altruism: failure to address such acute forms of
misgovernance within a broad developmental framework is likely to further increase
the likelihood of cross-national security threats in the future.”).
45. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, GOOD GOVERNANCE, THE IMF’S ROLE (1997),
available at  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govern.pdf.  For the
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”), “reforms of market mechanisms would focus pri-
marily on the exchange, trade, and price systems, and aspects of the financial system.
In the regulatory and legal areas, IMF advice would focus on taxation, banking sector
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Some studies examine governance broadly at the macro level across
a wide range of countries.  Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi estab-
lish six different “governance indicators,”46 focusing on “Voice and
Accountability,” “Political Stability and Absence of Violence,” “Gov-
ernment Effectiveness,” “Regulatory Quality,” “Rule of Law,” and
“Control of Corruption.”47  The definitions of these indicators are
rather vague and rely on subjective assessments rather than on ob-
jective data.  For example, “Rule of Law” is “the extent to which
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society.”48  A
large number of entities now participate in producing governance
ratings which are used in comparative governance studies,49 and
these ratings may also be used to implement lending policies.50  As
a result, countries that want to attract loans and investments have
an incentive to change their rules to improve their governance rat-
laws and regulations, and the establishment of free and fair market entry (e.g., tax
codes and commercial and central bank laws).  In other areas, however, where the IMF
does not have a comparative advantage (e.g., public enterprise reform, civil service re-
form, property rights, contract enforcement, and procurement practices), the IMF
would continue to rely on the expertise of other institutions, especially the World Bank.
But, consistent with past practice, policies and reforms in these areas could, as appro-
priate, be part of the IMF staff’s policy discussions and conditionality for the IMF’s
financial support where those measures were necessary for the achievement of program
objectives.” Id. at 4.
46. They define governance as “the traditions and institutions by which authority
in a country is exercised.” DANIEL KAUFMANN ET AL., GOVERNANCE MATTERS III: GOVERN-
ANCE INDICATORS FOR 1996-2002 2 (June 30, 2003), available at http://www.worldbank.
org/wbi/governance/pdf/govmatters3.pdf.
47. Id. at 3-4.
48. Id. at 4. The paper states that: “These include perceptions of the incidence of
crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of
contracts. Together, these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an
environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social
interactions, and importantly, the extent to which property rights are protected.” Id.
The paper does note the subjectivity of the assessments but states that in many cases it
would be impossible to obtain objective data. Id. at 19-23.
49. See, e.g., id. at 4-7 (describing use of sources).
50. The Millennium Challenge Corporation is the result of a US proposal to chan-
nel funds to countries that “govern justly, invest in their people and encourage eco-
nomic freedom.” See, e.g., Colin L Powell, Aid for the Enterprising, WASHINGTON POST,
June 10, 2003, at A21; Steve Radelet, Will the Millennium Challenge Account Be Different?,
26 WASHINGTON Q. 171 (2003). KAUFMANN ET AL., supra note 46, at 25, say that “the
substantial margins of error associated with governance estimates mean that it is diffi-
cult to assign many countries to a definitive performance category according to their
estimated level of governance.”
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ings, although they may not in fact find it easy to implement rule
changes, or to persuade observers that changes are real,51 or that
they will persist over time.52
A growing academic literature seeks to identify which rules are
most conducive to economic growth by examining differences be-
tween national rules.  Rather than looking at governance indica-
tors, some studies focus more narrowly on regulation,53 or on
particular areas of law such as corporate law and governance or
property rights.  Based on these comparisons, some scholars have
suggested that rules of corporate law may have a significant impact
on the success of a country’s financial system, and that common law
legal systems tend to produce stronger securities markets than civil
law countries because of the strength of their investor protection
rules.54
This story — that some legal rules are more conducive to eco-
nomic success and stability than others — tends to encourage the
convergence of legal systems.  The United Nations, the IMF, re-
gional development banks, the Organization for Economic Co-op-
eration and Development (“OECD”), and the developed nations
which belong to these organizations, all increasingly emphasize the
importance of good governance systems.55  Global harmonization
51. See, e.g., Collier & Gunning, supra note 38, at 20 (“even widespread policy
reforms . . . might not be sufficient to induce a recovery in private investment, since
recent economic reforms are never fully credible.  Investment rating services list Africa
as the riskiest region in the world.  Indeed, there is some evidence that Africa suffers
from being perceived by investors as a ‘bad neighborhood’”).
52. See, e.g., Timothy Frye, The Perils of Polarization, Economic Performance in the
Postcommunist World, 54 WORLD POLITICS 308, 309 (2002) (“political polarization has
made it difficult for governments to make credible commitments to respect existing
and future property rights.”).
53. See, e.g., HOSSEIN JALILIAN ET AL., CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL BUSINESS EXPANSION: THE IMPACT OF REGULATION ON ECONOMIC GROWTH IN DE-
VELOPING COUNTRIES — A CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS (Centre on Regulation and
Competition Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 54, 2003), available at  http://
idpm.man.ac.uk/crc/wpdl5099/wp54.pdf.
54. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998).
55. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 45; UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME, supra note 43; ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOP-
MENT ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF STOCK EXCHANGES IN TRANSITION
ECONOMIES (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/31/19/2078603.pdf;
Arthur Mitchell, Fostering Legal Reform in Central Asia, in LAW IN TRANSITION 1 (2003),
available at http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/law/lit/sp03/litspr03e.pdf (“the Asian Devel-
opment Bank (ADB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
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may have a certain value in itself as, all other things being equal,
harmonization limits opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.  Even
so, if there is to be a substantial degree of convergence in govern-
ance around the world, it would be preferable to converge on the
best rules possible.
As currently practiced, however, the Comparativist approach
and the harmonization it tends to engender may be self-limiting.
Specifically, the increase in legal harmonization is likely to pre-
empt potentially useful experimentation with alternative rules.  If
harmonization precludes real world experimentation with rules,
the argument for experimentation in virtual worlds is even stronger
than in a world without significant harmonization, if only because
of the lack of alternatives.
Legal harmonization happens in many ways.  Conquerors im-
pose their rules on the conquered.56  Law reform organizations re-
search rules in other places to inform their work.  Businesses lobby
for rules that exist in other places.57  Some businesses may be able
to relocate to jurisdictions with more desirable rules, creating a
threat that may persuade governments to adjust their rules.  Addi-
tionally, bureaucrats from different countries often get together in
(“EBRD”) have been development partners in Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikis-
tan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan for the past decade. Together they have helped im-
prove the lives of the region’s people by strengthening governance, economic
management and transformation and introducing market orientation and
competition.”).
56. See, e.g., WATSON, supra note 23, at 89.
57. For example, consider the spread of the limited liability partnership. See, e.g.,
THE LAW COMMISSION CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 159, THE SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION
DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 111, PARTNERSHIP LAW, A JOINT CONSULTATION PAPER, ¶1.13
(2000), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/library/lccp159/cp159.pdf (“The Act is
a response to pressure from large professional firms, which are concerned about the
unlimited liability of partners for very large legal claims, particularly for professional
negligence.  In large partnerships one partner may have no opportunity to assist an-
other partner to avoid such claims.  Partners may not know each other and one partner
may have no knowledge of another partner’s specialism.  The result which is proposed
is an entity giving limited liability to the partners other than the negligent partner.”);
Trade and Industry Select Committee, Draft Limited Liability Partnership Bill, Fourth
Report HC 59 (999), ¶16 (referring to the idea that competition from other jurisdic-
tions meant that “real problems . . . cannot wait for much longer”); Caroline Bradley,
Twenty-First Century Anglo-American Partnership Law, 30 COMMON LAW WORLD REV. 330
(2001).
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working groups to agree on common rules or standards.58  Interna-
tional or regional organizations produce harmonized rules.  Ac-
cordingly, three related sets of phenomena have intensified the
tendency towards legal harmonization in recent years: developing
regional integration, the increasing focus on issues of development,
and the generalized fear that bad things that happen elsewhere will
have negative effects at home.
The European Union (“EU”) has spent many years working to-
wards the harmonization of rules that support markets as part of its
larger agenda of creating a single market.  In recent years, the EU
has endorsed the idea that it should focus on improving the com-
petitiveness of European firms.  The EU has generally focused on
eliminating national rules that operate as barriers to the movement
of goods, services, and capital across borders.  Persuading the mem-
ber states to go along with the elimination of these barriers, how-
ever, often requires the adoption of common standards.  The
European Commission’s agenda for harmonizing legal rules within
the EU has recently expanded beyond company law and financial
regulation to harmonizing rules of contract law.59  Within member
states, commentators have diverging views about whether the har-
monization of private law is a good idea or not.60  Although Europe-
58. For example, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. See, e.g., JOHN
BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 104 (2000) (describing
how central bank governors established what is now the Basle Committee on Banking
Supervision in response to the failures of the Herstaat Bank and Franklin National
Bank in 1974). See also id. at 156-57 (comparing the International Organization of Se-
curities Commissions with the Basle Committee).
59. EU COMMISSION, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 255/01 (Sept. 13, 2001), available
at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2001/c_255/c_25520010913en000100
44.pdf; EU COMMISSION, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PAR-
LIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL: A MORE COHERENT EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW - AN ACTION
PLAN 63/1 (Mar. 15, 2003), available at  http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/
2003/c_063/c_06320030315en00010044.pdf.
60. E.g., Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60 MOD. L. REV. 44 (1997).
Compare with, e.g., STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE, THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE
STUDY GROUP ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION (Apr. 4,
2002), available at  http://europa.eu.int/futurum/forum_convention/documents/con
trib/acad/0022_r_en.pdf (“A uniform body of rules in those areas of private law which
underpin business activity in the EU is essential to convert the quilt of separate national
markets into a genuinely common market and ensure enterprises compete on a level
playing field.”).
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ans have different views about how much harmonization is
necessary, and others wonder how effective attempts at conver-
gence are, a significant amount of legal harmonization is happen-
ing in the EU.
The harmonization trend is not limited to the EU or to OECD
countries.  The nations of the former Soviet Bloc have been work-
ing on developing legal systems to serve as the basis for developed
financial markets and economic growth as part of their transitions
to capitalism, and this, too, has encouraged harmonization.  Inter-
national financial institutions have encouraged these transitions
with technical assistance in policymaking.61  Other international or-
ganizations have also set up programs to encourage economic de-
velopment throughout the world,62 with work on governance as an
essential element.63  Invariably, international financial institutions
advise newly capitalist economies to adopt rules already used in
more established market economies.  Commentators from different
perspectives have criticized these activities.  For example, critics of
the IMF write that the IMF’s recipes for economic success have left
people who live in developing countries without access to clean
water because they cannot afford to pay the price.64  An increasing
body of literature focuses on how transitions in different countries
61. See, e.g., IMF, IMF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE: TRANSFERRING KNOWLEDGE AND BEST
PRACTICE (May 2003), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/techass/
techass.htm.
62. See, e.g., United Nations Development Programme Press Release, Secretary-
General Kofi Annan launches Commission on Private Sector and Development, July 25,
2003, available at http://www.undp.org/dpa/pressrelease/releases/2003/july/25jul03.
html.
63. See, e.g., UN Press Release, In Message to Fourth Global Forum on Reinvent-
ing Government, Secretary-General Stresses Vital Role of Dialogue, Partnerships, Dec.
11, 2002, available at  http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SGSM8553.doc.htm
(“The United Nations is deeply engaged in the global effort to ‘reinvent government,’
particularly in developing countries and countries with economies in transition.  Activi-
ties include policy research and analysis, training programmes and advisory services.
The United Nations Online Network in Public Administration and Finance, known as
UNPAN, facilitates access to information, disseminates knowledge about ‘good prac-
tices’ and provides an international forum for the exchange of experiences.”).
64. See, e.g., Martha T. McCluskey, Subsidized Lives and the Ideology of Efficiency, 8 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 115, 133-35 (2000) (discussing consequences of the IMF’s
structural adjustment policies). See also id. at 134 n.97 (“neoliberal policies often result
in rising prices for non-luxury goods, such as food and water”).
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have produced different results.65  In particular, central European
countries and Russia initially made slow progress in developing a
“market-oriented legal structure.”66  It is possible that the advice to
duplicate existing rules was not ideal given the circumstances.
During the 1990s, problems in the Asian financial markets and
in Latin America led policymakers to worry about financial stabil-
ity.67  Countries that had attracted large amounts of foreign invest-
ment found that the foreign investors’ views could change sud-
denly, resulting in sudden capital outflows.68  Financial authorities
in the G769 developed economies established the Financial Stability
Forum70 (“FSF”) to address issues of international financial stabil-
ity.  The FSF concluded that international standards for rules, in-
65. See, e.g., Frye, supra note 52; Ja´nos Kornai, What the Chance of System From Social-
ism to Capitalism Does and Does Not Mean, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 27, 33 (2000) (identifying
three types of political transition from socialism to capitalism).
66. See, e.g., Jan Svejnar, Transition Economies: Performance and Challenge, 16 J. ECON.
PERSP. 3, 7 (2002) (“This lack of a market-oriented legal structure appears to have been
the Achilles’ heel of the first dozen years of transition. Many policymakers underesti-
mated the importance of a well-functioning legal system or believed too readily that
free markets would take care of any major problems.”).
67. See, e.g., Lawrence H. Summers, Reflections on Managing Global Integration, 13 J.
ECON. PERSP. 3, 12 (1999) (“Financial disturbances have propagated nationally and in-
ternationally with a virulence perhaps greater than at any time in the past 50 years.
Even nations thought to be managing their economies well, such as those in east Asia,
have seen financial disturbances wipe away years of economic progress and create mas-
sive economic insecurity among their citizens.”).
68. See, e.g., Michel Camdessus, Managing Director, IMF, Challenges Facing the
Transition Economies of Central Asia, Speech at a conference on Challenges to Econo-
mies in Transition, Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic (May 27, 1998), available at http://www.
imf.org/external/np/speeches/1998/052798.htm (“But if globalization offers many
opportunities, it also holds two major risks.  The first can be seen in the recent experi-
ence of Thailand, Korea, and Indonesia, all of which have suffered major financial cri-
ses during the last year, when investors lost confidence in their economies and large
capital inflows turned into massive capital outflows.  Countries that attract large
volumes of private capital are more vulnerable to sudden shifts in investor confidence,
which can be very destabilizing to their own economies and have negative effects on
other countries, as well.”).
69. The Group of Seven major industrial democracies: the United States, the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Canada. G7, WIKIPEDIA, at http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G7.  Russia joined the organization in 1998, forming the G8. Id.
70. See, e.g., Financial Stability Forum, at http://www.fsforum.org/home/home.
html (“The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was convened in April 1999 to promote
international financial stability through information exchange and international co-op-
eration in financial supervision and surveillance.”).
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cluding corporate governance standards and accounting standards,
would make a significant contribution to financial stability.71
Harmonization is happening.  The participants in the legal
transplants debate may disagree about how effective transplantation
of legal rules is, but many factors combine to promote attempts at
harmonization.  At the same time, the various decision processes
for agreeing on harmonized rules, which are often political or bu-
reaucratic processes, may or may not take account of whether the
harmonized rules are efficient.
Some commentators argue against harmonized rules for this
very reason, and suggest that competition in rulemaking is more
likely to produce efficient rules than top-down imposition of a sin-
gle rule-set.  For example, many United States commentators writ-
ing about corporate law argue that competition between the states
to attract incorporations may create a “struggle to the top.”72
Others argue in favor of extending this competition to securities
regulation, for example by devolving greater regulatory power to
non-state entities,73 or by allowing issuers of securities to choose the
securities laws that will apply to them,74 so that investors would, in
theory, have to take account of differences in securities regulation
regimes in making their investment decisions. Self Regulatory Or-
ganizations (“SROs”) suggest that they would like to compete for
the business of providing “market regulation services.”75
71. See, e.g., Caio Koch-Weser, Interim Chairman of the Financial Stability Forum,
Statement at International Monetary and Financial Committee Meeting (Apr. 12,
2003), available at  http://www.fsforum.org/press/IMFCstatement10.04.03.pdf (“Mem-
bers concurred that high-level international principles in the areas of corporate govern-
ance, auditing, accounting and disclosure are invaluable to restoring confidence in
financial markets and to achieving a level of convergence in regulatory approaches that
could eventually form the basis for mutual recognition across jurisdictions.”).
72. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).
Although compare with Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in
Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002).
73. See, e.g., Paul Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1455
(1997) (“I will argue . . . that the benefits of regulatory competition would be most
effectively achieved by devolving more regulatory authority to the bodies that were the
first regulators — the securities exchanges themselves.  In particular, exchanges should
be the primary writers and enforcers of rules relating to disclosure by listed companies,
standards of conduct for member broker-dealers, and market structure.”).
74. See, e.g., Choi, supra note 18.
75. See, e.g., Robert R. Glauber, NASD Chairman and CEO, Remarks To The Bond
Market Association Legal and Compliance Conference (Jan. 9, 2002), available at
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Competition between rule systems is limited in the real world
by concerns about the costs of error and the costs of success, most
notably the danger of setting off a harmful “race to the bottom.”
But eliminating competition between rule systems, particularly in a
world with increasing levels of legal harmonization, risks en-
trenching inefficiency.  The following section describes the virtual
worlds we suggest could be used to test alternate rules.
II. VIRTUAL WORLDS
Virtual worlds are more formally known as massively multi-
player online role-playing games (“MMORPGs”).  Before explain-
ing how virtual worlds may serve as useful test beds for legal experi-
mentation, it is useful to outline briefly some of the most salient
features of the leading games.  We do not attempt here to describe
the experience of playing online.  Nor do we discuss the legal con-
sequences of in-game behavior, which is already addressed in a
growing literature.76  Here, we seek first to persuade the perhaps
http://www.nasd.com/news/sp/pp1_27.html (“NASD will seek these new exchanges as
customers for our market regulation services. And building on our international repu-
tation, we will offer these same market regulation services to exchanges and regulators
in other countries.”).  Canada has an organization called Market Regulation Services,
Inc., which provides regulatory services to the Canadian markets. See RS Market Regula-
tion Services, Inc., at http://www.regulationservices.com/default.asp?location=home.
76. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, Linux, or, Linux and the Nature of the
Firm, 112 YALE. L.J. 369, 389 (2002) (discussing collaborative online gaming platforms
like Ultima Online and EverQuest as examples of “value-added” peer production and
large-scale collaborative works done over the Internet); EDWARD CASTRONOVA, VIRTUAL
WORLDS: A FIRST-HAND ACCOUNT OF MARKET AND SOCIETY ON THE CYBERIAN FRONTIER
(CESifo Working Paper Series No. 618, 2001) (describing the Everquest universe and
giving an overview of the economic and social impacts these games have generated in
the real world), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
294828 (last visited Sept. 26, 2003) (hereinafter “THE CYBERIAN FRONTIER”); EDWARD
CASTRONOVA, THEORY OF THE AVATAR (CESifo Working Paper Series No. 863, 2003)
(arguing that participation in virtual-world games like Everquest and Ultima Online
have “positive net effects” on the well being of players, and allows participants to experi-
ence varieties of social roles and normative values), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=385103 (last visited Sept. 26, 2003); EDWARD CASTRONOVA,
THE PRICE OF ‘MAN’ AND ‘WOMAN’: A HEDONIC PRICING MODEL OF AVATAR ATTRIBUTES IN
A SYNTHETIC WORLD (CESifo Working Paper Series No. 957, 2003) (utilizing price data
from online auctions of “avatars” used in the game Everquest to show that sex biasness
persists even in the virtual world), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.
cfm/SSRN_ID415043_code030617590pdf?abstract=415043 (last visited Sept. 26, 2003);
Arthur J. Cockfield, Designing Tax Policy for the Digital Biosphere: How the Internet is Chang-
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skeptical reader that these games are an important and growing
phenomenon, that many people already play these games with seri-
ousness and intensity,77 and that while existing games are of course
very simplified representations of reality, they nonetheless involve
substantial in-game economic activity.
MMORPGs are, as the name suggested, widely shared games.
The first “Multi-User Dungeon,” or MUD, was written in 1979 by
Richard Bartle and Roy Trubshaw.78  Most of the original
MMORPGs involved imaginary worlds populated by elves, dwarves,
ing Tax Laws, 34 CONN. L. REV. 333, 355 (2002) (“For example, tens of thousands of
gamers simultaneously play online role-playing games such as Everquest, and develop
their own value systems through the way they interact with others in their online uni-
verse.”); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91
CAL. L. REV. 439, 456 (2003) (describing how society tends to visualize the Virtual
World as a “place,” an example being the idea that people “explore” imaginary worlds
on the internet though online gaming communities such as, Everquest, Ultima Online,
Star Wars Galaxies, and Asheron’s Call); Dan Hunter & Gregory F. Lastowka, The Laws
of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1 (“In this Article, we provide a brief history of
virtual worlds and examine two legal questions raised by virtual world societies. First, we
ask whether virtual objects might be understood as constituting legal property. Second,
we discuss whether democracy and governance are concepts that might be applied
meaningfully to social conflicts that arise within virtual worlds.”); Joseph P. Liu, Copy-
right Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397, 418 (2003) (mentioning con-
sumer contributions to existing multi-player game platforms and recent cases that have
attempted to resolve who retains ownership rights in derivative works); Daniel C. Miller,
Note, Determining Ownership in Virtual Worlds: Copyright and License Agreements, 22 REV.
LITIG. 435 (2003) (discussing in part the impairing effects of end user license agree-
ments (EULA) on online-gaming participants’ abilities to copyright characters or items
created within virtual world such as Everquest or Ultima Online); Elizabeth Phillips
Marsh, Purveyors of Hate on the Internet: Are We Ready for Hate Spam?,  17 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
379 (2000) (explaining that an individual could use “avatar” space as a means of spread-
ing messages of hate); Molly Stephans, Note, Sales of In-Game Assets: An Illustration of the
Continuing Failure of Intellectual Property Law to Protect Digital-Content Creators, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 1513 (2002) (analyzing recent online practices that circumvent intellectual prop-
erty protections expected by digital-content creators); Timothy Wu, Application-Centered
Internet Analysis, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1163, 1197 (1999) (arguing that state regulation of the
internet is unnecessary and redundant when the specific internet environment is al-
ready self-regulated by a “private contractual order,” and that, “the really ‘pure’ exam-
ples of this are the popular online games like Ultima Online or network Quake, which
are multi-user versions of computer video games”).
77. We address the question of representativeness of the players later in this
section.
78. See Alexander P. Macris, Imaginary Worlds, Real Communities: Understanding
the Future Architecture of Cyberspace Through the Study of Massively Multiplayer
Games (Feb. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.) (citing
Lauren P. Berka, The MUDex, http://www.apocalypse.org/pub/u/lpb/muddex/).
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and various types of monsters.  MMORPG players can take on roles
as various types of people, and many games also allow players to
choose non-human “avatars.”  While MMORPGs vary, the most pop-
ular ones give the player either a rich, three-dimensional, virtual
reality image as if seen from the avatar’s perspective or — especially
in older games — a flatter, two-dimensional perspective akin to
what one gets when looking at a board game, with the avatars repre-
sented by little graphical characters known as “sprites.”  In general,
the greater the graphical artistry, the greater the demands on the
player’s hardware.  Fancier graphics do not, however, necessarily re-
sult in a proportionate increase in the load on a server, because the
user’s computer performs part of the work of drawing the images.
Ultima Online went live on February 12, 1998.79  Its graphics
are the most limited of the major English-language games, using a
fixed camera view showing two-dimensional sprites with isometric
perspective.80  (The graphics in the Asian Lineage game are also
limited.)  From the start, however, Ultima Online featured a rela-
tively complex economy based on players developing craft skills,
such as building houses, making goods, mining and smelting min-
erals, and generally engaging in trade.81  Everquest, developed by
Verant for Sony PlayStation, was the second MMO game to go on-
line, in February 1999. Everquest verges on a virtual reality experi-
ence, using “3D first-person perspective graphics comparable to
those in the game Quake.”82
By 1999, there were more than 350 MMORPGs in use or devel-
opment.83  Not all MMORPGs rely on a fantasy world.  The Sims
Online, an outgrowth of the highly popular stand-alone game, in-
vites people to replicate features of real life, albeit potentially glam-
orized.  (“Build a home and a livelihood.  Build your dream home,
the trendiest boutique, or the hottest neighborhood hangout
around . . . .  Be roommates and colleagues.  Develop a network of
friends, go into business with your housemates, or improve the
79. Id. at 8.
80. Id. at 9 (1999 data).
81. Id. at 12.
82. Id. at 9 (stating Everquest had over 200,000 in 1999).
83. Id. at 6.
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neighborhood.”)84  Even without monsters, the Sims Online gar-
nered 80,000 subscribers.85
Virtual worlds have evolved far beyond their origins as “sword
and sorcery” games and now employ complex rule-based econo-
mies in which hundreds of thousands of (sometimes fanatical) play-
ers engage in production, investment, and asset accumulation.
Millions of people play them.  As a result, they are an important
revenue source for game companies.  More importantly for our
purposes, the larger games involve a world of fantasy trade and pro-
duction that, if it were valued at the rate of exchange suggested by
online auction prices for virtual assets, suggests the existence of a
substantial economic base.  Indeed, the gross national product
(“GNP”) of one virtual world for 2001 is estimated at $135 million
— $2,266 per capita, making it richer per capita than China or In-
dia, neither of which is inhabited only part-time.86
Virtual worlds differ from stand-alone computer games in sev-
eral ways.  Like some computer games, players begin by selecting
their avatar — a game character whose movements through the
84. The Sims Online website states:
The Sims Online is an online world where the Sims are real.  You get to
be yourself or whoever you want to be.  In this world you have your own
piece of land to do with as you please. So, you can create a house, coffee
bar, dance club, museum or whatever else you can imagine.  You can ex-
plore the neighborhoods around you and meet other real Sims along the
way.  You’ll also be able to develop a network of real Sim friends to enhance
your power, wealth, reputation and social standing.
. . .
The Sims placed you in control of an entire neighborhood of Sims.  In The
Sims Online, players create up to three Sims but only control one at a time,
meaning that the relationship between a player and their Sim is much
closer.  The game not only makes it possible for Sims to leave their house
but there is a whole user-created world to explore.  Not only can each
player build a house for their Sim and have friends over to visit, they can
also invite friends to move in.  The economic and social interaction system
is built to take advantage of having thousands of real people playing.  The
game incorporates text chat, instant messaging and a wide variety of new
gestures for your Sim to use when communicating with other Sims.
http://www.eagames.com/official/thesimsonline/features/top-april02.jsp?ncc=1.
85. Brad King, Online Games Go Multicultural, WIRED, Jan. 30, 2002, available at
http://www.wired.com/news/games/0,2101,50000,00.html.
86. CYBERIAN FRONTIER, supra note 76, at 33.
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games space the player will control.87  The MMORPG game design-
ers define a continuously running (“persistent”) shared play space
— the world — which consists of one or more shared spaces for
avatars to explore and use.  Like stand-alone games players typically
have to complete some set of tasks, perhaps killing monsters or
finding treasure, in order to win game-based rewards such as more
powers for their character or game funds.  Unlike stand-alone
games, however, thousands of players use the world simultaneously.
While players are online, they interact with each other — they con-
verse, they cooperate, they fight, and they transact.  Unlike stand-
alone games, when a player logs off, the world does not stand still; it
continues to change under the influence of other players who re-
main active in the game space.88
Like stand-alone games, most MMORPGs depend on a com-
plex client program that runs on the user’s computer.  Each in-
stance of the program communicates with a server, sending it
information about changes in the game arena that the avatar can
perceive.  Most of the popular virtual worlds allow players consider-
able scope to build homes (or, in the case of the sword-and-sorcery
games, castles), to amass economic resources, and to train their ava-
tars in various skills.  Skills are not limited to fighting, or healing
wounded fighters, but include a range of productive skills such as
mining, building, and making useful objects such as clothing.  Most
games follow the convention that as avatars gain experience from
completing certain tasks, they get promoted to higher “levels” and
gain power and abilities.
As Edward Castronova has documented, large numbers of peo-
ple spend very large amounts of time immersed in virtual worlds.89
As the structure of many virtual worlds makes it difficult, time-con-
suming — and even boring — to “level up” avatars to the point
where they have substantial skills and resources, some people reach
for shortcuts.  Valuing time over money, these players go outside
87. For a thorough discussion of the economics of avatar selection, see EDWARD
CASTRONOVA, THEORY OF THE AVATAR (CESifo Working Paper No. 863, 2003), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=385103.
88. Games do differ on what happens to avatars when their owner is not playing.
Many have some convention that protects the absent player’s avatar from coming to
(fatal) harm when its owner isn’t looking.
89. See CYBERIAN FRONTIER, supra note 76.
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the game to purchase game-based resources or high-level avatars.
The volume of transactions in Everquest coinage and characters al-
lowed Castronova to estimate the exchange rate for Norrath’s plati-
num coins against the US dollar at 1.07 cents per platinum coin.90
Based on his estimates of the amount of time it takes to create vir-
tual value, and the trading prices of avatars on dollar denominated
outside-of-game markets, Castronova also estimated the GNP of
Norrath to be as high as $135 million.  In per capita terms, Ever-
quest’s world had a GNP of as much as $2,266 per head.  Using a
range of estimating techniques, Castronova gave Norrath a GNP
per capita somewhere between Russia and Bulgaria.91  Using survey
data, Castronova estimated an average hourly wage for Norrath ava-
tars at 319 platinum pieces per hour, which at the market rate of
exchange worked out to $3.42 per hour.92
Virtual worlds are a substantial and rapidly growing segment of
the gaming market.  MMORPGs aimed at North American clients
generate revenue by monthly subscription billed on a per-user ba-
sis, and the more successful ones have very large numbers of sub-
scribers.  Everquest is the largest English-language game, with more
than 200,000 participants.93  Lineage, popular in South Korean and
neighboring Asian states, claims more than 4 million users.94  Line-
age, however, charges by the IP number, not by the user, reflecting
a usage pattern in which players log in from cybercafes.95
According to the Themis Report on online games, MMORPGs
earned revenues in 2001 of about $275 million, of which about
three-quarters were from monthly or annual subscription fees.  A
small number of popular games earned the lion’s share of this in-
90. Id. at 32.
91. Id. at 32-33.
92. Id. at 35.  He also noted that:
The average Earth wage . . . among the self-identified residents of Norrath
. . . is $17.57. If we treat the conditions of life in Norrath as a compensating
differential, this suggests that for the average Norrath resident, an hour in
Norrath produces utility worth $14.15. This figure is more than the fee of
$10 per month that users pay to access Norrath. Norrathians gain a substan-
tial consumer surplus from the world’s existence.
Id.
93. Macris, supra note 78, at 8.
94. NCsoft, Lineage, at http://www.lineage.com/nci/nci.html.
95. THEMIS GROUP, THE THEMIS REPORT 2002, at 14 (hereinafter “THEMIS
REPORT”).
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come.  Themis projected virtual world revenue to nearly triple in
2002, with much of the sector’s growth due to the entry of new
games, and to triple again by 2006, by which point it could reach
$1.84 billion worldwide.96  Of the circa 100 million worldwide who
regularly play some form of online game, about half are in the
United States.97  Of these, as many as 7.5 million people may be
“hard-core” players of virtual worlds — playing twenty or more
hours per week (and sometimes forty or even eighty hours per
week)98 — with between 2-3.5 million hard-core players in the
United States.99  Indeed in 2001, Edward Castronova estimated that
up to a third of EverQuest players spend more time playing the
game than they spent in paid real world employment.100  These
hard-core players also account for the bulk of the sector’s reve-
nue.101  Another estimated 15-22.5 million people, a third of whom
are in the United States, are “moderate” players, who play fewer
different games per person and spend fewer hours on virtual worlds
per week.
Whatever their intensity of use, players in North America pay
on the order of $10-13 per month for subscriptions.102  Players else-
where, notably in South Korea, a hotbed of virtual world activity,
ordinarily pay considerably less.  In addition, most games require
that users acquire a copy of the client that runs the game; if ac-
quired at retail in North America this can usually cost between $10-
$40.103
If nothing else, these figures demonstrate that current players
will pay to play; it also suggests that there are a substantial number
of people who might be willing to participate in online legal experi-
ments in exchange for a discount on their gaming bills.  The value
of this army of potential experimental subjects depends on the ex-
tent to which they are representative of the population at large.
96. Id. at 2.
97. Id. at 3.
98. Id. at 7.
99. Id. at 3.
100. CYBERIAN FRONTIER, supra note 76.
101. THEMIS REPORT, supra note 95, at 5.
102. Id. at 9.
103. Id. at 9-10.
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In the United States, virtual world players are a subset of com-
puter gaming enthusiasts, themselves a subset of computer and In-
ternet users.  By contrast, in parts of Asia, virtual world penetration
has reached epidemic proportions.  Multi-player games claim one
out of four teenagers in South Korea.104  Of its 4 million players,
perhaps three-quarters are in South Korea, with another million or
so in other nations, primarily Taiwan.  NCsoft also recently began
marketing the game in China,105 and hopes for tens of millions of
subscribers there as well,106 although data on actual takeup does
not seem to be publicly available.
With the notable exception of the Sims Online, the virtual
worlds most popular in North America involve fantasy, magic, and
violence.  It seems, therefore, that they may attract an unbalanced
sample of the population unless, of course, the taste for fantasy,
magic, and violence is in fact very widespread.  This suspicion seems
particularly plausible given the excesses in the most violent of the
virtual worlds.  For example, a leading game industry expert once
described Ultima Online’s community as “a Hobbesian war of all
against all, a chastening reminder of anarchy and lawlessness”
marked by “a palpable feeling of terror in the streets. . . [that]
makes you appreciate cops, or at least, makes you realize the value
of living in a society that is policed.”107  This does not sound like a
good model on which to base tests of the Uniform Commercial
Code (“UCC”), although it might have some use if one were seek-
ing to model police strategies for the most dangerous neighbor-
hoods in the United States — which might actually be a good idea,
as current policing policies seem unable to make them safe.
Ultima Online is the extreme case.  Other games either do not
allow players’ avatars to kill each other, or limit the gankage108 to
well-demarcated kill zones.  Many other games, such as Everquest,
do not allow characters to kill one another.  In the less extreme
104. See Soo-Jeong Lee, Online Game Craze Sweeps South Korea, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
May 12, 2003, available at http://www.bizreport.com/article.php?art_id=4394.
105. See http://www.lineagechina.com/about/customer.html.
106. SINA and NCsoft Enter Definitive Agreement to Form Online Game Joint Venture in
China, at http://wwwus.sina.com/news/press/2002/1122/press.html.
107. Macris, supra note 78, at 15 (quoting GREG COSTIKYAN, FUTURE OF ONLINE
GAMES 57 (1999)).
108. To gank is to kill another player’s avatar.  Gankage is the noun meaning the
process of ganking.
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games, the only players who may attack each other are those who
have explicitly and mutually assumed the risk of injury caused by
inter-player mayhem, or those who choose to play on predefined
“player-killer” servers.109  It may be that people with violent tenden-
cies gravitate to games like Ultima Online, where player-killing is
allowed.110  In other games, where players have a choice as to
whether they venture into “kill zones” where players are allowed to
kill each other, only a small fraction of the players choose this op-
tion.111  Indeed, many players avoid the games with rampant player-
killing.112
In fact, Hobbsean violence is a characteristic of only a small
subset of the Virtual World population.113  One game development
109. Macris, supra note 78, at 9.
110. See id. at 22-23.
111. This is 10% of the players in Everquest. See id. at 23.  On the other hand, the
relative unwillingness of players in Everquest to risk kill zones may be an economically
rational calculation based on the chance of being killed as a function of population
density:
[T]he number of violent encounters between players will go up as roughly
the square of the increase in population. And it’s not hard to accept the
assumption that being killed in PvP is a more frustrating experience than
having to wait in line to kill a popular item-dropping mob. . . . [T]his theory
. . . would predict that if the amount of territory available on a  “Zek” server
[an Everqust server with a ruleset that allowed players to attack each other at
any time] was increased, then so would the population. . . .
[When the Everquest Scars of Velious expansion pack] came out, and the
populations of the Zek servers rose significantly, then stabilized at a higher
level. The theory that all of the players in EQ who wanted to play PvP, al-
ready were, was disproven, and the theory that the lower populations of
“hardcore” servers were lower due to different parameters of population
pressure was strengthened.
Dave Rickey, If You Can’t Say Anything Nice . . ., Engines of Creation #6 (Aug. 12, 2003),
at http://www.skotos.net/articles/engines06.shtml.
112. For example, Macris quotes Tessa, described as “a high-level Everquest player”
as writing:
I don’t think I’m overgeneralizing to say that 90% of those who’ve moved
to EQ from UO did so because of a cowardly refusal on the game designers’
part to “protect players from aggression before the fact” (to use Koster’s
phrase), i.e., to deal with the PK problem straightforwardly, as EQ has
done. I came to absolutely detest, loathe, hate, abominate UO for that
reason.
Macris, supra note 78, at 17 (quoting Tessa, Gamers General Forum, at http://eq.
stratics.com).
113. Macris finds evidence for all three of the following hypotheses: (1) human
nature becomes more violent in Ultima Online than it is in real-space (virtual soci-
opathy), (2) a disproportionately large number of humans who are violent in real-space
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pioneer suggests there are four types of people attracted to online
shared environments, “achievers, explorers, socialisers and killers,”
who are those attracted respectively to “achievement within the
game context,” “exploration of the game,” “socialising with others,”
and “imposition upon others.”114  Others have emphasized the so-
cial nature of online gaming.115  These commentators suggest that
what goes on when people play games is much more complicated
than simply venting murderous urges.116
In addition, Castronova’s work, noted above, documents the
extent to which virtual behavior mimics the real life experience of
labor, even labor at repetitive and boring tasks.  Furthermore, there
is evidence suggesting that whatever the demographics of
MMORPG players, the population of online game players more
closely reflects the population at large.117  The earliest adopters of
the Internet were predominantly a certain type of white male, but
now Internet users more closely reflect the US population as a
whole, and some day may comprise nearly the entire population.  It
may be only a matter of time before the MMORPG population un-
dergoes a similar transformation, although this is certainly an issue
that requires careful monitoring and study.
play Ultima Online (player-killers), or (3) the level of violence in Ultima Online would
occur in real space but for some non-architectural factor (laws and norms.) Id.
114. Richard Bartle, Hearts, Clubs, Diamonds, Spades: Players Who Suit MUDs, at
http://www.brandeis.edu/pubs/jove/HTML/v1/bartle.html (suggesting that each
ludic type approaches the game differently: Achievers see them as games like chess or
tennis; explorers see them as hobbies akin to gardening and cooking; socializers see
them as entertainment; and killers treat them as sports like hunting or fishing.  Unfor-
tunately, these categories don’t seem sharp enough to be useful).
115. E.g., Mikael Jakobsson & T.L. Taylor, The Sopranos Meets EverQuest: Social
Networking in Massively Multiplayer Online Games, at http://hypertext.rmit.edu.au/dac/
papers/Jakobsson.pdf (“social networks form a powerful component of the gameplay
and the gaming experience”).
116. Arguably the virtuality of the killing in the more violent MMORPGs such as
Ultima Online liberates or encourages antisocial behaviors that people would not en-
gage in real life: “Killing an Ultima character does not kill the Ultima player, just his
avatar.  The result is a guilt-free opportunity to commit mayhem which Ultima Online
players seem to revel in at least part of the time.”  Macris, supra note 78, at  21.
117. E.g., Adult Women Like to Play Games, REUTERS, Aug. 27 2003, at http://www.
wired.com/news/games/0,2101,60204,00.html.
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Game designers can influence the sorts of behaviors virtual
worlds encourage by making architectural choices in the design of
the game environment:118
So game design can influence social order, although
not always in predictable ways. Social dynamics seem to be
inherently emergent, with effects many stages removed
from their causes, and the line of causality is rarely clear.
Nonetheless, influence is being exerted, and sometimes
in quite dramatic ways. The question becomes how much
our control of this influence can be refined?119
This fact bodes well for the ability of would-be rule mechanics to
design more realistic environments in which participants act ever
more normally.  It also tends to support the claim that rules affect
outcomes.
The similarities and differences between virtual worlds and re-
ality are particularly noticeable in the economic realm. In most
sword and sorcery games, players seek to raise their characters’ ex-
perience scores, to make them more powerful, and to amass game
currency (e.g., gold, platinum), which allows their characters to ac-
quire useful items.  Especially in the initial phases of a game, this
can involve performing an extremely lengthy series of fairly boring
and repetitive tasks, such as slaying hundreds of small vermin, or
mining for metals.  In fact, games are often designed to encourage
some players to choose to have their characters specialize in some
form of craft, such as baking or smithing.120  Here again, practice
makes more perfect.  If trade is only a part of the sword-and-sorcery
experience, it is an even larger component of the Sims.  In that
game, as players seeking the revenue they need to improve their
virtual real estate compete with each other to provide interesting
accommodations and diversions for other players, each temporary
118. See Bartle, supra note 113 (“To appeal to achievers, for example, one approach
might be to introduce an extensive level/class system (so as to provide plenty of oppor-
tunity to reward investment of time) and to maximise the size of the world (so there is
more for them to achieve).”).
119. Rickey, supra note 111.
120. See Julian Dibbell, The Unreal Estate Boom WIRED, Jan. 2003, available at http://
www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.01/gaming.html.
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“houseguest” earns the host players revenue (measured in
Simoleans).121
Some observers focus solely on a given game’s differences from
reality.  Castronova, for example, observes that economic life in vir-
tual worlds is “different in important ways from life on Earth.”122
Castronova offers the example of price controls.  In real life, price
controls are difficult to enforce and tend to have perverse effects.
In a virtual world, however, price controls are easy to enforce
(within the game at any rate).  Furthermore, quantities are easy to
manipulate because game controllers can create or destroy any
amount of virtual goods at near-zero cost by entering the right com-
mands into the game engine.  Castronova concludes that given the
ease of administration, “price controls may actually be good policy”
in virtual worlds,123 but this does not tell us much about the utility
of price controls in “meat space.”  On the other hand, Castronova
also acknowledges areas in which the internal economic behavior of
virtual worlds mimics reality.  For example, “in Brittania, the world
of the game Ultima Online, avatars can make shirts and sell them.
Once upon a time, a certain agent decided to collect and hoard
10,000 shirts.”124  As a result, the price of shirts rose.125
Other observers find substantial similarities between aspects of
current games and real life social practices.126  Within the games,
sales of virtual chattels and virtual real property mimic real world
markets.  Goods are alienable, and many games offer intermediat-
ing institutions designed to facilitate exchange, such as market
places or auction houses, although market places seem to go in and
121. See F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL.
L. REV. 1 (2004).
122. EDWARD CASTRONOVA, ON VIRTUAL ECON. 3 (CEFifo Working Paper No. 752,
2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=338500.
123. Id. at 4.
124. CASTRONOVA, supra note 87, at 14.
125. Id.
126. Note, however, that in the Asian Lineage game, the social and economic setup
is basically feudal, with most players voluntarily choosing to be commoners, a role that
excludes any possibility that character becoming royalty and leading a faction in the
game. See J. C. Herz, The Bandwidth Capital of the World, WIRED 10.08 (Aug. 2002).  We
leave to others the research required to see to what extent this actually reflects the
social structure in Asia.
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out of fashion rather quickly.127  Consider also Lastowka and
Hunter’s observation that:
[p]erhaps the most striking feature of the property sys-
tems of the virtual worlds is how closely they mirror the
real world, or at least the subset of the real world known
as Western capitalist economies.  No virtual world, not
even a community-conscious, social MUD like Lambda-
MOO, has an entirely communal property system. Private
property is the default. Capitalists feel right at home here
because virtual worlds assume the timeworn metaphor of
property being a bundle of fundamental rights usually
rendered as the rights to use, exclude, and transfer.128
There are a number of reasons for this mirroring.  One may be, as
Lastowka and Hunter suggest, that player/customers object to unfa-
miliar, or unpopular, economic systems.  Lastowka and Hunter
note that the Sims Online “began as an exception to the free mar-
ket rule and people generally found it unpleasant for this reason.
One purchased chattels from something like a central government
agency that refused to negotiate on price.”  When players rebelled,
the Sims Online introduced a freer market.129
Another set of reasons for the similarity of most virtual markets
to Western capitalism may have to do with the identity of the game
designers.  When forced by the needs of a game to find a way to
facilitate transactions, designers brought up in the United States
may naturally have mimicked what they knew.  In Ultima Online,
for example, the designers have replicated the registered bond,130
the promissory note,131 and the commission agent.132
Thus, while virtual worlds might be an opportunity to test alter-
nate property systems (maybe market socialism?),133 the players’
openness to alternate forms of economic organization imposes
127. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 121, at 30.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 31.
130. See Commodity Deeds, at http://guide.uo.com/trade_1.html.
131. See Scam Prevention, at http://support.uo.com/scam.html (describing bank
checks).
132. See Vendors, at http://guide.uo.com/trade_4.html.
133. See Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 121, at 31-32. Cf. OSKAR LANGE, ON THE
ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIALISM (Benjamin E. Lippincott, ed., 1938).
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some attitudinal constraints.  These constraints, however, strongly
resemble constraints that would confront any real life attempt to
adopt similar rules.
The ease with which MMORPGs can be replicated makes them
particularly suited for experimentation.  Popular virtual worlds
have more players than can comfortably be accommodated in one
virtual world.  The game operators’ solution has been to clone the
world — in the case of Everquest more than forty times.  Multiple
copies of the world (called “shards” in Ultima Online) may be iden-
tical, or they may have different rules.134  Thus, for example, the
rules in one shard may allow anti-social behavior such as robbery
and murder, while others with the same maps and environment,
may not.
III. USING VIRTUAL WORLDS TO TEST RULES
Given that the adoption of less than optimal rules involves
costs, it is desirable to test rules before adoption to examine their
likely effects.  As noted, real world empirical studies of the effects of
actual rules suffer from the risk that a study will not identify crucial
factors affecting the operation of the rules in practice.  In particu-
lar, studies that leave out specific institutional and cultural factors
may suggest erroneous conclusions. Some studies on the effects of
social programs do seek to experiment with and compare different
policy interventions, but these studies tend to focus on disadvan-
taged groups.135  Economic models can give some indications about
how rules may work, but are always subject to the risk that their
assumptions are inaccurate and that any inaccuracies in the as-
sumptions undermine the reliability of the test results.
Behavioral economists have begun to examine the behavior of
economic actors empirically using relatively simple studies where
“real subjects make decisions with real monetary consequences in
134. See CYBERIAN FRONTIER, supra note 76, at 29 (“The other four servers are
player-killer servers, where, because of the frequency of murder and robbery, property
rights are feeble. Predictably, markets on these servers are poorly developed.”).
135. See, e.g., David Greenberg et al., The Social Experiment Market, 13 J. ECON. PERSP.
157, 159 (1999) (“The scarcity of experiments involving the middle and upper class is
extraordinary.”).
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carefully controlled laboratory settings.”136  These studies suggest,
for example, that people may not always behave in the self-inter-
ested way that traditional economic theory would suggest; instead
of simply being economic maximizers, many people are concerned
about fairness.137  In the “Ultimatum Game,” involving two partici-
pants, one player (the proposer) must suggest to the other player
(the respondent) how she proposes to divide a sum of money be-
tween them.  The respondent decides whether to accept the pro-
posed allocation, in which case both would receive shares in
accordance with the proposal, or not, when neither player would
receive anything.138  In these experiments, players tend to propose
arrangements more favorable to respondents than economic theory
would suggest.  Some games test other ideas, such as how trusting
people are.139  Researchers also test whether players from different
cultural backgrounds play games differently.140  Results of some ex-
periments suggest that  people in some countries are more trusting
than others.141
These experiments focus on people’s behavior, rather than on
the effect of legal rules, and are oriented to the testing of economic
assumptions about behavior.  Thus, they are important for aca-
demic lawyers who are interested in the economic effects of legal
rules.  In particular, academic lawyers are interested in how people
value assets differently in different contexts.  A person may be will-
ing to pay much less for a thing than the amount he or she would
136. ERNST FEHR & KLAUS SCHMIDT, THEORIES OF FAIRNESS AND RECIPROCITY – EVI-
DENCE AND ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 4 (Institute for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ.
of Zurich, Working Paper No. 75, 2001), available at http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/
iewwp075.pdf.
137. See, e.g., id.
138. See, e.g., Marc J. Knez & Colin F. Camerer, Outside Options and Social Comparison
in Three-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments, 10 GAMES AND ECON. BEHAV. 65, 67 (1995).
139. Joyce Berg et al., Trust, Reciprocity and Social History, 10 GAMES AND ECON.
BEHAV. 122 (1995).
140. See, e.g., Hessel Oosterbeek et al., Cultural Differences in Ultimatum Game Experi-
ments: Evidence from a Meta-Analysis (2003), available at http://www1.fee.uva.nl/scholar/
mdw/sloof/Ultimatum MetaMarch03.pdf; Rachel Croson & Nancy Buchanan, Gender
and Culture: International Experimental Evidence from Trust Games, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 386
(1999).
141. See, e.g., Marc Willinger et al., A Comparison of Trust and Reciprocity Between
France and Germany: Experimental Investigation Based on the Investment Game, 24 J. OF ECON.
PSYCH. 447 (2003) (suggesting that Germans are more trusting than the French).
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expect to receive to give it up.142  This cultural difference has impli-
cations for ideas of property rights and for a range of rules of busi-
ness organization law.
The design of behavioral experiments may affect the results —
which raises questions about how much they tell us about the real
world.  Game experiments often use students as the participants in
the games rather than a range of people with different characteris-
tics.143  The student test subjects may volunteer for the experi-
ment,144 and may receive small payments for participating.145
Experiments to test endowment effects may involve testing how stu-
dents value the mugs the researchers give them.146  The context,
however, makes a difference.147  Students may respond differently
to ownership of a mug depending on whether they “feel their status
as owners has an independent moral justification.”148  Using stu-
dents as test subjects may skew test results.  If one wanted to test
levels of trust, age and life experience might make a difference.  As
a result, the controlled settings for the experiments necessarily
mean that they are artificial.149
142. See, e.g., Jennifer Arlen et al., Endowment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relation-
ships, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (2002) (“[T]he maximum amount a nonowner would be
willing to pay for an entitlement is often significantly less than the minimum amount
she would demand to part with it if she initially owned it.”); Russell Korobkin, Empirical
Legal Realism: a New Social Scientific Assessment of Law and Human Behavior: the Endowment
Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2003).
143. See, e.g., Willinger et al., supra note 141, at 456-57; Berg et al., supra note 138,
at 129.
144. See, e.g., Willinger et al., supra note 141, at 456-57.
145. See, e.g., Berg et al., supra note 139, at 129. Research suggests that even small
payments may have an effect on participants in the experiments.
146. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and
the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990).
147. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 142, at 1242 (“[L]egal scholars need to take care
to ensure the closeness of their contextual analogies and not to lose sight of the fact
that their conclusions will often be contingent on the soundness of such analogies.”).
148. Arlen et al., supra note 142, at 9.
149. See, e.g., Arlen et al., supra note 142, at 33 (“[E]xperimental research is neces-
sarily constrained within a specific, controlled environment, purposely isolated from
other aspects of the real world. This isolation is both its great strength and its profound
weakness. Observing a predictable behavioral pattern within a controlled experimental
setting enables researchers to make causal claims with minimal fear that unobserved
phenomena or reverse causality are driving their results. Yet this very controlled setting
makes it difficult to generalize to real-world settings that are the focus of policy reform
proposals.”).
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Virtual worlds could be a better venue for testing legal rules
and people’s responses to those rules.150  Behavioral experiments
tend to rely on a pool of available students who are willing to par-
ticipate rather than being enthusiastic about the experiments.  Any
experiment that used virtual worlds could attract a large number of
enthusiastic — even fanatical — players who would have a real in-
vestment in the game.  Their investment in the game would be
closer to an investment in real life than the types of investments
students tend to have in simple games.  Some virtual world partici-
pants prefer to live in the online world than in the real world.151
Indeed, some players become “immersed” in the games and begin
to take their virtual life so seriously that they forget that it is a
game.152  Of course, any attempt to harness a virtual world as an
experimental tool would require the informed consent of the ex-
perimental subjects — a somewhat ironic problem for any experi-
ment that might be designed to test consumer comprehension of
rules.
Although they are artificial, virtual worlds are artificial in dif-
ferent ways than are experiments such as ultimatum games, trust
games, and mug studies.  Yet, virtual worlds are similar to these
games in that they are more controllable and modifiable than the
real world. Virtual worlds are more complex than simple experi-
mental games (making them more like the real world) and yet they
are, for now, simpler than the real world (making them more man-
ageable).  Virtual worlds are also more easily manipulated than are
real world experiments: the game’s designers can choose which
variables to modify while leaving the others constant.  Different ver-
sions of the game, or “shards,” can run at the same time, thus al-
lowing for testing of how rule variations affect players’ behavior.153
150. The idea that virtual worlds might have something to teach us about reality
has not escaped other commentators. See, e.g., Lastowka & Hunter, supra note 121, at
33 (“A third reason for exploring the laws of virtual worlds is that they represent an
amazing experiment in law-making, and provide a serious challenge for real life legal
systems.”).  Our aim in this paper is to make the case and to discuss where it is most and
least likely to work.
151. See generally supra text accompanying notes 76-101.
152. See Jane McGonigal, “This is Not a Game”: Immersive Aesthetics and Collective Play
(2003), at http://hypertext.rmit.edu.au/dac/papers/McGonigal.pdf.
153. Unless the purpose of the experiment was to see which rule system players
preferred, players would have to be randomly assigned to different rule systems.
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One can imagine different ways of structuring the experiment.  In
one version the operator of the game might allocate players to dif-
ferent shards at random; in another, players could choose which
rule set they preferred ex ante; in another, players could participate
in the development of the rules by expressing their views about
what proposed changes to the rules they would like to see.  In this
version, the game would not merely test different rules identified by
the experimenters but would also harness player creativity to design
better rules.
While virtual worlds have characteristics that make them look
like useful test beds for legal rules, existing games do have charac-
teristics that may limit their usefulness.  Virtual worlds seem like the
real world in that they are interactive, social environments.154  But
in a number of ways the assumptions built into the games may not
track reality.  Games may assume scarcity, whereas in the real world
some things are scarce and others are not.  Games may assume that
it is better to cooperate than to work alone.155
To the extent that virtual worlds’ usefulness as test beds for
legal rules is based on their similarity to the real world they also
threaten to raise the legal transplants issue mentioned earlier —
just because a rule works well in Norrath does not mean that it
would work in the same way in Newark, much less Nepal.  But the
very simplifications that make game worlds possible also allow re-
searchers to decide what to model, what to leave out, what to hold
constant, and what to vary.  Thus transplanters of legal rules from a
virtual world into a real world context might find it easier to think
about how the conditions in the real world differ from those in the
virtual world than would be the case in a real world to real world
transplant.  Moreover, virtual worlds themselves allow researchers
to experiment with how different conditions affect the application
of the rules.  Furthermore, if experimenters are able to control the
nationality of who plays in their shard, virtual worlds offer the addi-
tional advantage that the players can be drawn from the same soci-
154. “[S]ince the VWs are inherently social, the achievements are relative: it is not
having powerful weapons that really makes a difference in prestige, but in having the
most powerful weapons in the world. In a postindustrial society, it is social status, more
than anything else, that drives people to work so diligently all their lives. In this respect,
VWs are truly a simulacrum of Earth society.” CYBERIAN FRONTIER, supra note 76.
155. See CYBERIAN FRONTIER, supra note 76.
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ety as the one for which the rule is being tested.  Any unknown and
unstated cultural assumptions are likely to be replicated in the
model, rather than being missing from it, because the players natu-
rally bring their assumptions with them.  Thus, rather than have to
trust that Newark’s rule fits Nepal, one need only have reason to
believe that Newark’s gamers, or the United States’s more gener-
ally, act online in ways that sufficiently resemble their earthbound
selves.
We think we could use virtual worlds to test a wide variety of
questions about how law works, but not all of them.156  In this sec-
tion, we suggest which types of rules are most likely to lend them-
selves to testing in virtual worlds, and which types of rules are less
easy to test in this manner.  In general, virtual worlds would seem to
be more useful for testing relatively simple rules and also more
complex rules in relatively simple contexts.  Even with this substan-
tial limitation, however, virtual worlds provide a fertile testing
ground for a number of existing legal beliefs and potential
innovations.
A. What Should Work?
Virtual worlds generate a range of different transactions, and
participants in these worlds inflict harm on other participants in
various ways.  Virtual worlds therefore inherently invoke ideas of
property, contract, and tort.  A player in Ultima Online or Ever-
quest owns weapons, may buy and sell those weapons, and may use
them to hurt other players.  As a result, the game needs to have
rules regulating the types of property rights a player can have in
weapons, the ways in which transactions in weapons may be accom-
plished, and the consequences of inflicting harm on another
player.
Real and Chattel Property Regimes.  De Soto and others who focus
on development emphasize the significance of property rights on
156. Virtual worlds could also shed light on some economic issues, such as how to
identify people who would be likely to be successful entrepreneurs.  People who showed
entrepreneurial approaches to playing online games by developing new strategies that
took advantage of particular characteristics of the games might also be successful entre-
preneurs in meat-space. Venture capitalists could decide to allocate capital to people
who showed success in making simoleans. Note that this would only work if one could
guarantee that the simoleons were self-made rather than bought on eBay.
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economic success.  Participants in virtual worlds own property, and
some items of the property they own are more valuable than others.
But perhaps the property rights thesis could be tested — or sharp-
ened — by having parallel virtual worlds with different types of
property rights.  One version of a game might be designed to see
how players would react to a wide range of different rights that
could exist with respect to a particular item of property.  Players
might be able to lease their property to others for a number of days
or weeks or for certain hours in the day.  Lease contracts might
allow sub-leases, or they might not.  A player with many swords
might get into the business of leasing swords to other players.  A
player might sell swords on credit and expect to have a security in-
terest in the transferred, but not yet paid-for sword, allowing for
investigation of different arrangements for security interests and for
rules about the transfer of risks.  Different versions of a game might
demand compliance with formal requirements for the transfer of
property, or could allow recognition of informal transfers.  A virtual
world could experiment with socialism and dispense with individual
ownership of property, or provide for redistribution of property.
Tax Policy.  In the same way that virtual worlds might allow for
testing of different allocations of property rights, they might also
allow for testing of some basic general ideas of tax policy.  Clearly it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to test detailed technical rules
in a virtual world, but different shards of a game could have differ-
ent tax regimes.  One shard could impose taxes at a flat rate, while
another could have a progressive tax system, allowing the experi-
menter to compare the results.  One could also measure players’
attitudes towards different trade-offs between tax regimes and social
expenditures.  For example, one could measure the effect on player
satisfaction of making healers more effective in a game with higher
tax levels.
Transactional law.  Characters in virtual worlds enter into sim-
ple transactions with each other.  They meet to buy and sell items in
the game, or agree that they will journey together to a new place in
order to find a needed item.  Games may be structured so that suc-
cess at a particular task requires a number of different skills that
one character alone is unlikely to have.  Therefore, players would
need to negotiate how to obtain the benefit of another character’s
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skills.  Such agreements may look like agency or employment rela-
tionships, or even partnership, if the players agree to share the
profits of the expedition.  Thus, in virtual worlds one could not
only expect to see simple transactions involving buying and leasing
of property, and perhaps loans of money, but also simple business
relationships.  It would be possible to run different versions of the
virtual world where some had limited liability business forms and
others did not, although these different arrangements would clearly
be sensitive to tort rules in the game.  One could explore the rela-
tionships between tort and contract rules by testing, for example,
the effects of allowing tort damages for breaches of contract (which
seems to match the expectations of many non-lawyers).  Different
versions of a game could implement different arrangements for the
enforcement of contractual obligations.
Tort.  Characters in virtual worlds can suffer physical harm and
economic losses, although the implications of physical harm are dif-
ferent.  Virtual worlds would not be useful test beds for rules about
the measure of damages — characters may have to pay for the ser-
vices of healers, but this is unlikely to be as expensive or compli-
cated, and certainly not as physically painful, as acquiring the
services of doctors and hospitals in the real world.  On the other
hand, it should be possible to test the effects of having, or not hav-
ing, an economic loss rule precluding damages for economic loss
except where there is physical damage.  Virtual worlds could also be
used to supplement the results of simpler experiments investigating
endowment effects, or status quo effects, which would be interest-
ing for many areas of law that rely on the Coase theorem,157 includ-
ing environmental law.
Insurance.  Players in virtual worlds might want to insure against
the risks of harm or economic loss, so the games could be used to
test different rules about what risks are insurable and different ar-
rangements for dealing with moral hazard.
157. The Coase theorem holds that if private parties can bargain over the distribu-
tion of resources without cost, then the parties will allocate the costs of externalities in a
manner that efficiently allocates resources.  It follows that if the bargain cannot be
reached, or if there are transactions costs, efficient allocation in the face of externalities
may require the intervention of a third party. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960), available at http://www.sfu.ca/~allen/CoaseJLE1960.pdf.
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Dispute Resolution.  Virtual worlds may also provide a test bed
for some features of dispute resolution mechanisms.  In the real
world, judges may tailor the rules they develop in order to limit the
number of disputes that may come to court in the future.  In virtual
worlds, one could experiment with costless access to courts.  In this
model, players would experience the costs of dispute resolution pri-
marily as costs in time, rather than money.  Comparing the litigious-
ness of participants to a different shard in which litigation was
expensive (or even to similarly situated real life litigation) might
provide valuable information about the sensitivity of quantity of liti-
gation to financial cost.
Jurisprudence.  Virtual worlds might also allow testing of various
moral intuitions at the foundation of important strands of modern
political philosophy, although some obstacles would need to be
overcome.  A major theoretical move in John Rawl’s Theory of Justice
presupposes an imaginary “veil of ignorance” that prevents rational
actors in a hypothetical “original position” from knowing what their
physical, cognitive, familial, racial, national, and economic endow-
ments will be in society, and then asks what rules they would choose
if ignorant of their actual role and abilities.158  Rawls — implicitly
taking people to be risk-averse rather than risk-loving — argues
from the premise that rational people behind the veil of ignorance
would agree on two principles of justice.159  Their first principle
would affirm an equality of basic rights.160  Their second principle,
known as the difference principle, would hold that all inequalities
are unjust, unless removing them would worsen the situations of
the worst-off members of society.161  It would be trivially easy to de-
sign a virtual world in which players were unaware of their future
avatar’s characteristics and endowments.  Faced with the prospect
of participating in such a game, players could be polled, or even
asked to come to an agreement, as to their preferences for how
abilities and endowments should be handed out, and what social
policies should dominate the game.  Since players would be making
these choices before the game started, however, it might be difficult
158. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap 1999) (1971).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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to get them to take it as seriously as they would take rules that af-
fected an avatar in which they had expended substantial effort.  In
particular, in order for the experiment to be meaningful, players
would need to believe that they could not simply quit the game and
start another one if they got stuck with a lousy avatar.
B. What Might Not Work?
We can identify a number of different factors that would get in
the way of using virtual worlds to test real world rules.  In essence,
these factors are all consequences of the ways in which virtual
worlds (inevitably?) differ from the real world.  Virtual worlds are
less complex than the real world and relationships in virtual worlds
are different from relationships in “meat space.”  Virtual worlds do
not (currently) have elected governments, and they do not have
nations, although they do have tribes, factions, guilds, clans, and
racial (or species) groupings.
Complex Rules.  Virtual worlds are less factually complex than
the real world. Any area of law dealing with highly complex factual
situations in real life would be difficult to translate to the virtual
world.  In a virtual world, a player might seek a remedy for misrep-
resentation about the characteristics of an item for which they be-
lieve, after the transaction that they overpaid.  But business
enterprises in online games do not issue securities to other players,
and even if players did offer people the opportunity to invest in
their business activities in return for a share of the profits, the legal
issues involved would look much more like those involving simple
fraud than like complex securities regulation.
One set of implications of this lower level of complexity in vir-
tual worlds is that they do not (so far) include lawyers.162  While it is
possible to conceive of the development of Everquest lawyers in re-
sponse to a development of law, until that time it would be advisa-
ble to avoid using legal rules that would be so complex that players
would need to consult a lawyer to understand them.  In fact, this
idea of using the games to examine the extent to which people can
use legal rules without the involvement of lawyers could be interest-
162. We would argue that this shows that game developers lack imagination when it
comes to creating seriously aggressive monster classes.
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ing,163 but a range of complex rules — such as tax rules, and de-
tailed rules of civil and criminal procedure — would fall outside the
scope of testing through this sort of game.
Family Law. Many rules of law deal with relationships.  We sus-
pect that rules of family law and inheritance would not translate
well to virtual worlds.  Characters in virtual world games may
“marry” other characters but these marriages are very different
from real world marriages (players can select the gender of their
avatars much more easily than people currently can), and are insu-
lated from the stresses and strains of everyday life.  Even if charac-
ters in virtual worlds have children, those children are never related
to them biologically.  Your real life kids may not play the same
game, and if they do they are unlikely to want to play as your virtual
kids (although they might want to be your parents!).
Administrative Law and the Legislative Process. Virtual worlds do
not currently have elected governments — most seem anarchic,
feudal, or mysteriously governed by “gods” who are in fact the game
operators.  Some have authorities that exercise police powers, and
different games could include different rules limiting the freedom
of action of the policing authorities.  It might be possible to imag-
ine a virtual world in which players elected representatives who
would act as legislators within the world, but they would do so
within a system run by designer/gods/experimenters who set the
fundamental rules, and are not term-limited, so there would inevita-
bly be a limit to what the player/legislators could decide.  Legisla-
tors in the real world are often limited by a constitution, but
designer/gods/experimenters of virtual worlds are unlikely to want
to allow the players to amend the worlds’ constitutions.  In the real
163. The Canadian province of British Columbia recently proposed introducing a
new simpler system of securities regulation. See, e.g., BRITISH COLUMBIA SECURITIES COM-
MISSION, NEW CONCEPTS FOR SECURITIES REGULATION, A NEW WAY TO REGULATE 5
(2002), available at http://www.bcsc.bc.ca:8080/Historycomdoc.nsf/0/ffb85755a68dce
2e88256b64005970f8/$FILE/New_Concepts.pdf; BRITISH COLUMBIA SECURITIES COM-
MISSION, SECURITIES REGULATION THAT WORKS. THE BC MODEL, COMMENTARY ON DRAFT
LEGISLATION 3 (2003), available at http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/Publications/BC_Model/
Commentary.pdf.  Issuers suggested that they would be more likely to interpret simpler,
“plain language” rules themselves rather than consulting a lawyer. CHRISTINA WOLF,
BETTER DISCLOSURE, LOWER COSTS, A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF THE CONTINUOUS MAR-
KET ACCESS SYSTEM 16 (2002), available at http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/Publications/CBA_Re
port.pdf.
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world constitutional change may be arduous or bloody, but it can
happen.  On the other hand, the operators of virtual worlds may
change their worlds in response to market pressures.  If players dis-
like particular constitutional features in one world they may mi-
grate to another.  To the extent that we could examine
constitutional and administrative law issues in virtual worlds, we
would run again into the fact that the virtual worlds are less com-
plex than the real world.
Transnational and International Law.  The absence of anything
resembling modern governments in the major virtual worlds means
that even when separate nations exist in current virtual worlds,
their relationships are unlikely to be meaningful representations of
international law.  Thus, a range of issues in transnational and in-
ternational law arising in the real world cannot be reproduced in
existing virtual worlds.  Because virtual worlds have no international
trade, there is no scope for international trade law other than, per-
haps, tariff law.  There is no need for rules of public or private in-
ternational law.164  Moreover, one could imagine a need for
admiralty law only in games with substantial sea-based trade.
Zoning.  Some real world property problems may be too com-
plicated to model in virtual worlds.  In games like the Sims Online
where players try to make simoleans by attracting customers/rent-
ers to the properties they develop, it might be possible to experi-
ment with different zoning regimes.  Two shards of the same game
could have different zoning arrangements: one unregulated and
the other with zoning controls.  One could then study the patterns
of development under the different systems and test which out-
come players preferred.165  Clearly, however, zoning in the real
world is very different from zoning in a virtual world, and the impli-
cations of having a toxic waste dump next to your apartment build-
ing in the real world are likely to feel very different from the same
experience in a game.
Intellectual Property.  Like zoning, intellectual property involves
complex technical issues in the real world that a game could not
164. Migration between different shards is very different from immigration in the
real world.
165. One could run the test either by seeing which system players preferred to
enter initially, or by allowing players to move from one shard to the other.
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test.  However, arguments about IP law often center on arguments
about whether strong IP rights are necessary to encourage en-
trepreneurial activity.  We think it is possible that one could test
such claims in virtual worlds, although it would be necessary to run
the games for a long time in order to obtain useful data.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a world where real world experimentation with legal rules is
likely to be useful, but also difficult and expensive, experimentation
with legal rules in virtual worlds may be a valuable substitute.  Large
numbers of enthusiastic players in virtual worlds could test legal
rules in an environment closer to the real world than many of the
experiments that behavioral economists run to test economic be-
havior.  The cost of running these experiments would involve the
expense of developing the games, but one could free ride on the
existing market for games.  One would, however, want to sell the
games, because giving them away would risk undermining the mar-
ket for existing games.  Experimenting with rules in virtual worlds
also avoids the real world economic and psychological costs of ex-
perimenting with interesting, but ultimately harmful, rules.
